The 2014 local elections and the announcement of a cunning tactic

Looking at the preparations for the March 30th, 2014 local elections across Turkey as a whole, the resulting picture is one that should never have emerged, with some parties not planning any election rallies in the Southeast at all. Although they should have been able to go and hold rallies in those areas, opposition parties that should have embraced the people there were unable to go to the Southeast part of Turkey because their safety could not be guaranteed. They were unable to embrace their own people on their own lands.

In the Southeast of Turkey, almost no political party can hold a public demonstration with their own party flags. Due to the influence of the fear empire that the PKK found, the Southeastern people cannot attend the demonstrations with Turkish flags; our own flag is almost prohibited by the PKK, which has exerted dominance over the region.

Even AKP deputies said that they were unable to travel freely in the Southeast, that it was difficult for them to hold rallies, and that party members in district party offices weren’t able to hold welcoming parties. AKP deputy Orhan Miroğlu described the situation in the words, “Fear can get the best of people.”

The measures in question by the opposition parties were also taken during the general election on June 7th, 2015. These precautions were necessary, because they knew that an act of violence against Turkish political parties might come at any moment and that the state was not in full control of the region. A part of their own country was completely closed to the country’s democratic political parties.

This situation still applies in some areas, and is regarded as quite normal by many. A little reflection, however, will reveal the gravity of the situation and the threat that those lands still face.

The communist groups also benefited from the democratic protests of environmentalist youth groups during the Taksim Gezi Park protests in 2013. The local elections on 30 March 2014 seemed like a vote of confidence after the protests. But the most serious consequence of this election was that the entire Southeastern part of Turkey was lost to the BDP, the PKK-backed party. “Goes to Taksim commune”

It is now clear that the local elections of  March 2014 meant something more for Turkey, than just local elections. The results of the local elections, which came to represent a vote of confidence in the wake of a year of various uprisings and turmoil, particularly the Gezi Park protests, were of separate significance to each of the parties. In the days that followed the Solution Process, especially with the guarantees given to the Kurdish people, the greatest expectation in the context of the plans for development and regeneration of the Southeast, were that the ruling party or the opposition parties would emerge victorious in the region. Yet that is not what happened.

The fact that BDP municipalities emerged victorious in all the provinces of the Southeast and that the BDP came out on top in cities where the AKP and MHP had once been dominant, sent a highly significant message. Efforts were obviously being made to seize the citadel from the inside; a party openly supported by the PKK had grown stronger. This clearly showed that during the period known as the Solution Process, when PKK militants were expected to lay down their weapons and leave the country, the PKK had not pulled out of the country at all, but was still operating its oppressive system and this time, a very different method for breaking Turkey up was being implemented.

Before moving on to the details, it is very important to make one point quite clear; the BDP, now known as the HDP, is a legal political party within the Turkish democratic system. It possesses the same rights as all other parties in a democracy. It will certainly continue its work as a legally constituted party under the protection of the state. Any physical or verbal attack on this party and its members is a grave blow to democracy and must attract the appropriate legal sanctions.

The PKK's insidious activities that aim to lay hold of the cities continued with the efforts to legalize the PKK. During the ceasefire, the erecting of a statue of Mahsum Korkmaz (the first commander of the PKK) and putting up posters of PKK terrorists on municipality buses indicated the severe magnitude of the PKK threat. Following the handing over the Southeastern provinces to the BDP in 2014 local elections, the 2015 general elections yielded worse results. HDP declared its sovereignty over a large area reaching up to Northeastern Anatolia.

The only reason why we are differentiating the HDP in terms of the Southeast is that this party is supported by the PKK. Indeed, as we shall be seeing in the context of the structure of the KCK, the party in question is most likely under severe pressure from the KCK/PKK. This represents a grave threat to the country. The way that ever since the beginning of the Solution Process, party officials have made frequent references to the subject of autonomy, have shifted their tone with respect to this point and have made great efforts to have legal status granted to Abdullah Öcalan all point to a significant threat. The victory of a party saying such things, particularly in such a region as the Southeast, should rightly lead to serious concerns.

Let us remind ourselves that the 2015 general elections produced an even worse picture in terms of the Southeast. Readers will recall that regions where the HPD emerged as a powerful presence were not limited to the Southeast, but also stretched as far as Ardahan in the Northeast. The reason why we are particularly citing evidence from the local elections here is the dire consequences today, when we are in a time of conflict, of a party backed by the PKK controlling local administrations. We shall be looking at this in detail in due course.